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Abstract—Graph classification has practical applications in
diverse fields. Recent studies show that graph-based machine
learning models are especially vulnerable to adversarial pertur-
bations due to the non i.i.d nature of graph data. By adding or
deleting a small number of edges in the graph, adversaries could
greatly change the graph label predicted by a graph classification
model. In this work, we propose to build a smoothed graph
classification model with certified robustness guarantee. We have
proven that the resulting graph classification model would output
the same prediction for a graph under l0 bounded adversarial
perturbation. We also evaluate the effectiveness of our approach
under graph convolutional network (GCN) based multi-class
graph classification model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Graph has strong capability to represent natural relational
data such as citation network, bio-medical molecular, social
network etc., which provides wide opportunities to utilize
graph based machine learning models.
Graph classification, or the problem of assigning labels to a
graph in a dataset, has found practical applications in diverse
fields, including malware detection[1], learning molecular
fingerprints [2], and anticancer hyperfood prediction[3]. For
example, in chemoinformatics, graphs can be used to represent
molecules, with nodes signifying atoms and edges denoting
chemical bonds of atom pairs, and a label of a graph given
by a graph classification algorithm could denote molecular
properties such as the anti-cancer activity, solubility, or toxi-
city. While there exist many classic approaches, graph neural
networks (GNNs) represent the state-of-the-art in frequently
applied tasks on graph data and have attracted great attention
recently [4], [5], [6].
Despite of their remarkable performance, GNNs have been
shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks [7], [8], i.e.,
deliberately designed and small perturbations in the graph
structure or node features of a graph could lead to drastically
degraded performance of a GNN model. Such observation
poses great challenges in applying GNNs to real-world appli-
cations, especially safety-critical scenarios such as healthcare
and transportation. Therefore, ensuring the robustness of GNN
models is of significant importance to the wide applicability
of these models.
Compared with traditional machine learning models, it
is especially challenging to ensure the robustness of GNN
models due to the non-i.i.d. nature of graph data. Specifically,
the adversarial effects of an attack against a node or edge
can propagate to other nodes or edges via the graph structure,
making the space of possible attacks very large. Until now,
there are only very few mechanisms that can effectively defend
against the adversarial attacks in GNNs [9]. Most proposed
mechanisms are best-effort and heuristic methods for training
GNN models intended to be robust to adversarial attacks, and
they are most likely to fail given suitably powerful adversaries
as observed from the robustness research in traditional ma-
chine learning models.
On the other hand, certifiable robustness ensures that a
classifier whose prediction at any point is verifiably constant
within some set around the point. By offering a theoretically
justified guarantee of robustness, adversarial attacks can be
provably defended. The research line of providing certifiable
robustness for GNN models has emerged in very recent
studies [10], [11]. However, these studies tend to be tied to
internal GNN model details, such as the types of aggregation
and activation functions, and cannot easily generalize across
different types of GNN models. Moreover, their computational
complexities are often very high (e.g., solving an NP-hard
problem) and do not immediately scale to large GNN models.
Providing robustness guarantee for graph classification
model in these applications is an important but unsolved
problem. In this paper, we focus on providing robustness
guarantee for graph classification models based on randomized
smoothing[12], [13], [14], which turns any base classifier into
a robust classifier via adding random noise (usually Gaussian)
to the input data. There are several challenges originate from
the inherent nature of graph data though, including how to
add commonly used Gaussian noises to the discrete graph
structure and how to provide discrete l0 certification instead
of l2 in graph data. We address the above challenges by using
discrete random noise sampled from Bernoulli distribution and
deriving the analytical bound for the robustness guarantee of
the smoothed GNN classifier in the l0 norm metric.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We propose a certifiable robustness method for graph
classification models that can achieve both scalability and
general applicability.
• We propose to use Bernoulli distribution as the random
noise to perturb the graph data and smoothen the decision
boundaries of the classic GNN models by ensemble
prediction.
• We evaluate our approach based on graph convolutional
network (GCN), and empirically demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of our approach for multi-class graph classifica-
tion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, the
related works is introduced in Section II. Then, our proposed
method to provide certifiable robustness of graph classifica-
tion models based on randomized smoothing is illustrated in
Section III. Next, experimental results are given in Section IV.
Finally, Section V makes the conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
Our work is related to two categories of recent research:
graph classification and graph adversarial attacks.
A. Graph classification
There are several approaches of graph classification, includ-
ing kernel-based approaches which measure similarity between
graphs[15], [16], and neural network approaches which lever-
age machine learning framework to learn graph features[17].
Inspired by recent progress of Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN), two approaches, convolutional approach[4], [18], [5]
and pooling approach[15], [19], [20], [21] are proposed with
the aim to generalize the convolution and pooling operation in
graph neural network. Among these approaches, graph neural
network approach, especially GCN, has been widely used
since it provides state-of-the-art performance in many cases.
B. Attack and Defense in Graph-based Learning
Machine learning models are vulnerable to attacks. Two of
the main attack scenarios are evasion attacks [22], [23] and
poisoning attacks [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], focusing on test
time and training time, respectively. Compared to non-graph
data, attacks and defenses on graph data are less investigated.
Previous attacks on graph-based learning are mainly focusing
on transductive setting, and thus are mostly poisoning attacks
[29], [30]. Little evasion attacks on graph-based learning are
investigated [31]. With the development of new inductive
learning algorithms on graph data, the risk of evasion attacks
increases. Evasion attacks are often instantiated by adversarial
examples, which are crafted by making small, often imper-
ceptible perturbations to legitimate inputs, with the goal of
misleading a learned classifier to misclassify the resulting
adversarial inputs. Note that adversarial examples generated
from one model usually are also harmful for other model,
known as transferability [32]. In this paper, we investigate
how we could improve the robustness of graph-classification
algorithms against evasion attacks.
III. CERTIFIED ROBUSTNESS FOR GRAPH CLASSIFICATION
In this section, we will introduce notations and our approach
to provide certified robustness guarantee for graph classifica-
tion model.
A. Notations and Graph Classification Model
Given a set of graphs D = {(G1, c1), (G2, c2), · · · , },
where the number of nodes may differ in each graph. For
an attributed graph G = (A,X), we have adjacency matrix
A ∈ {0, 1}n×n and feature matrix X ∈ {0, 1}n×d, where n
denotes the number of nodes in corresponding graph and d is
the number of node features. For each graph, it has related
label c ∈ C, where C denotes the set of labels. The goal of
graph classification is to learn a function f : G → C, where
G is input space of graphs.
B. Attack model
We consider the attack scenario where an attacker can only
change the topology of graph G by removing existing edges
or adding new edges into the original edge set, forming a new
graph G˜. For simplicity, we use a binary vector xG ∈ {0, 1}
N
to represent the flattened adjacency matrix A, whereN denotes
the length of vector. Then, the adversarial perturbation vector
ǫ is introduced to model whether a corresponding edge is
perturbed or not, and ǫi denotes the i-th element of ǫ.
Specifically, ǫi = 1 if the corresponding edge is perturbed,
otherwise, ǫi = 0. Formally, given the binary vector xG of
original graph G, by perturbing the edges according to the edge
perturbation vector ǫ, the new binary vector x˜G of perturbed
graph can be represent as:
x˜G = xG ⊕ ǫ, (1)
where the operator ⊕ denotes the “exclusive or” binary oper-
ation.
C. Achieving Certifiable Robustness with Randomized
Smoothing
With randomized smoothing, we construct a new,
“smoothed” classifier g from an arbitrary base GNN classifier
f . When queried at a specific unlabeled graph G, the smoothed
classifier g returns whichever label the base classifier f is
mostly likely to return when the topology of graph G is
perturbed by certain random noises:
Pr(ǫi) =
{
β ǫi = 0
1− β ǫi = 1
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} (2)
where i is i-th element of binary vector ǫ. In our scenario
each element in the binary vector has probability β to keep
unchanged and has probability 1−β to flip the structure. Then,
the smoothed classifier is defined as:
g(xG) = argmax
c∈C
Pr(f(xG ⊕ ǫ) = c) (3)
where c is the class which has largest probability measure
under noise perturbation ǫ. Certifying robustness against any
adversarial attack is to certify that g(xG ⊕ δ) = c for all
‖δ‖0 = L, where L denotes certified perturbation size.
Next we will introduce how to derive the certified per-
turbation size of smoothed classifier g. Given the smoothed
classifier g defined in (3), one can certify the model’s output
against adversarial perturbation within range L. Formally, we
have the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Given a graph represented with xG ∈ {0, 1}
N ,
a graph classification model f : G → C, and a smoothed
classifier g defined in (3). Suppose cA ∈ C and there exists
pA, pB ∈ [0, 1] such that
Pr(f(xG ⊕ ǫ) = cA) ≥ pA ≥ pB ≥ max
c 6=cA
Pr(f(xG ⊕ ǫ) = c).
(4)
Here, pA denotes the lower bound probability of the most
probable class cA and pB denotes the upper bound probability
of the “runner-up” class of f under random noise ǫ. Then,
g(xG ⊕ ǫ) = cA for all ‖δ‖0 < L, where L is certified
perturbation size and can be calculated by solving the follow
optimization problem:
L =argmax l
s.t.‖δ‖0 = l,
µ1−1∑
k=µ2
Pr(xG ⊕ ǫ⊕ δ ∈ Hk)+
(pA −
µ1−1∑
k=1
Pr(xG ⊕ ǫ ∈ Hk)) ·
Pr(xG ⊕ ǫ⊕ δ ∈ Hµ1)
Pr (xG ⊕ ǫ ∈ Hµ1)
>
(pB −
µ2−1∑
k=1
Pr(xG ⊕ ǫ ∈ Hk)) ·
Pr(xG ⊕ ǫ⊕ δ ∈ Hµ2)
Pr (xG ⊕ ǫ ∈ Hµ2)
(5)
The region H(e) and density ratio h(e) are defined as [33]:
H(e) = {z ∈ {0, 1}N} :
Pr(xG ⊕ ǫ = z)
Pr(xG ⊕ ǫ⊕ δ = z)
(6)
h(e) = (
β
1− β
)e (7)
where e = −N,−N + 1, · · · , N − 1, N . The region
H(−N),H(−N + 1), · · · ,H(N) is ranked in an ascend-
ing order according to the density ratio h(−N), h(−N +
1), · · · , h(N). And we denote them as H1,H2, · · · ,H2N+1
according to their orders. We define µ1, µ2 as follows:
µ1 = argmin
µ′∈{1,2,··· ,2N+1}
µ′, s.t.
µ′∑
k=1
Pr(xG ⊕ ǫ ∈ Hk) ≥ pA
µ2 = argmin
µ′∈{1,2,··· ,2N+1}
µ′, s.t.
µ′∑
k=1
Pr(xG ⊕ ǫ ∈ Hk) ≥ pB
(8)
Proof: Here, we first restate the Neyman-Pearson Lemma
under discrete space [33], and then provide the proof for
Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. Assume X and Y are two random variables in the
discrete space {0, 1}n with probability distribution Pr(X) and
Pr(Y ), respectively. Let ψ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a random
or deterministic function. Let T1 = {z ∈ {0, 1}
N : Pr(X=z)Pr(Y=z) }
and T2 = {z ∈ {0, 1}
n : Pr(X=z)Pr(Y=z)} for some t > 0. Assume
T3 ⊆ T2 and T = T1 ∪ T3. If Pr(ψ(X) = 1) ≥ Pr(X ∈ T ),
then Pr(ψ(Y ) = 1) ≥ Pr(Y ∈ T ). If Pr(ψ(X) = 1) ≤
Pr(X ∈ T ), then Pr(ψ(Y ) = 1) ≤ Pr(Y ∈ T ).
We first define two random variables as follow:
X = xG ⊕ ǫ
Y = xG ⊕ δ ⊕ ǫ
(9)
which represent the random samples after adding noise to the
binary vector xG and xG⊕δ . Our goal is to find the maximum
perturbation size ‖δ‖0 such that following condition hold:
Pr(f(Y ) = cA) > Pr(f(Y ) = cB) (10)
We first define two regions Q1,Q2 such that Pr(X ∈ Q1) =
pA,Pr(X ∈ Q2) = pB . Specifically, we gradually add the
region H1,H2, · · · ,H2N+1 to the Q1,Q2 up to Pr(X ∈
Q1) = pA, Pr(X ∈ Q2) = pB . In particular, we define
µ1, µ2 as:
µ1 = argmin
µ′∈{1,2,··· ,2N+1}
µ′, s.t.
µ′∑
k=1
Pr(xG ⊕ ǫ ∈ Hk) ≥ pA
µ2 = argmin
µ′∈{1,2,··· ,2N+1}
µ′, s.t.
µ′∑
k=1
Pr(xG ⊕ ǫ ∈ Hk) ≥ pB
(11)
Moreover, we define Hµ1 ,Hµ2 as any subregion of Hµ1 ,Hµ2
such that:
Pr(X ∈ Hµ1) = pA −
µ1−1∑
k=1
Pr(X ∈ Hk)
Pr(X ∈ Hµ2) = pB −
µ2−1∑
k=1
Pr(X ∈ Hk)
(12)
Then, the region Q1,Q2 can be represent as:
Q1 =
µ1−1⋃
k=1
Hk ∪Hµ1
Q2 =
µ2−1⋃
k=1
Hk ∪Hµ2
(13)
Based on the condition of equation 4, we have:
Pr(f(X) = cA) ≥ pA = Pr(X ∈ Q1)
Pr(f(X) = cB) ≤ pB = Pr(X ∈ Q2)
(14)
Define the function ψ(z) = I(f(z) = c). Then, we have:
Pr(ψ(X) = cA) = Pr(f(X) = cA) = Pr(X ∈ Q1)
Pr(ψ(X) = cB) = Pr(f(X) = cB) = Pr(X ∈ Q2)
(15)
Moreover, we have
Pr(X=z)
Pr(Y=z) > hµ1 ,
Pr(X=z)
Pr(Y=z) > hµ2 if and
only if z ∈
⋃µ1−1
j=1 Hj , z ∈
⋃µ2−1
j=1 Hj separately. We also have
Pr(X=z)
Pr(Y=z) = hµ1 ,
Pr(X=z)
Pr(Y=z) = hµ2 for any z ∈ Hµ1 , z ∈ Hµ2 .
Note that Q1 =
⋃µ1−1
k=1 Hk∪Hµ1 and Q2 =
⋃µ2−1
k=1 Hk∪Hµ2 ,
According to Neyman-Pearson Lemma mentioned before, we
can obtain that:
Pr(f(Y ) = cA) ≥ Pr(Y ∈ Q1)
Pr(f(Y ) = cB) ≤ Pr(Y ∈ Q2)
(16)
To reach our goal, it’s sufficient to have:
Pr(Y ∈ Q1) ≥ Pr(Y ∈ Q2)⇔
Pr(Y ∈
µ1−1⋃
k=1
Hk ∪Hµ1) > Pr(Y ∈
µ2−1⋃
k=1
Hk ∪Hµ2 ⇔
µ1−1∑
k=1
Pr(Y ∈ Hk) + (pB −
µ1−1∑
k=1
Pr(X ∈ Hk))/hµ1 >
µ2−1∑
k=1
Pr(Y ∈ Hk) + (pA −
µ2−1∑
k=1
Pr(X ∈ Hk))/hµ2
(17)
Next, we present a practical algorithm evaluating the g(xG)
and provide the certified robustness guarantee of g around xG .
Given a base graph classifier f and a graph G, the evaluation
includes two stages. Firstly, we need to identify the most
probable class cA. Then, we need to estimate the lower bound
probability pA and upper bound probability pB under random
noise corrupted input xG ⊕ ǫ.
Our approach is implemented based on Monte Carlo
method. We first sample M random noises and use cor-
respondingly perturbed graphs as input. Denote the most
frequently appeared class when querying the output as cA.
Formally, we have:
cA = argmax
c∈C
ηc
s.t. ηc =
M∑
m=1
I(f(xGm ⊕ ǫ = c)),
(18)
where ηc is counter of class c appeared during the sampling,
and I is the indicator function.
Then, the lower-bound probability pA can be estimated
using one-sided Clopper-Pearson method:
pA = LCB(ηc,M, 1− α), (19)
where LCB(·) denotes lower-confidence-bound function
which returns one-sided lower confidence interval for the
Binomial parameter p such that ηc ∼ Binomial(M,p) with
probability 1− α.
For the upper bound probability pB , it’s very hard to give
accurate maximum probability among remain classes if |C| >
2. In actual algorithm, we just take: pB = 1−pA. And in this
situation, pB < 1−pA leads 1−pA < pA, which is pA > 0.5
in return. If pA <= 0.5, the algorithm will abstain.
To solve the optimization problem in equation (5), the key
is calculating two probabilities Pr(xG ⊕ ǫ ⊕ δ ∈ H(e)) and
Pr (xG ⊕ ǫ ∈ H(e)). Formally, we have:
Pr (xG ⊕ ǫ ∈ H(e)) =
min{N,N+e}∑
k=max{0,e}
βN−(k−e)(1−β)k−e·θ(k),
(20)
Pr (xG ⊕ δ ⊕ ǫ ∈ H(e)) =
min{N,N+e}∑
k=max{0,e}
βN−k(1−β)k·θ(e, k),
(21)
where θ(k) is:
θ(e, k) =

0, if (e + l) mod 2 6= 0
0, if 2k − e < l(
N−k
2k−e−l
2
)(
l
l−e
2
)
, otherwise
(22)
After we calculate the two probabilities, the optimization
problem can be solved iteratively. Our whole algorithm is
summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Certification and Prediction
Input: f , xG , β, M, α
1: counts ←− SAMPLE(f , β, xG , M);
2: cˆA, cˆB ←− top two classes in counts;
3: ηA, ηB ←− count [cˆA], count [cˆB];
4: pA ←− LCB(ηA, M, 1− α);
5: if BPV(ηA, ηA + ηB , 0.5) ≤ α and pA >
1
2 then
6: L = RADIUS(pA, pB , xG);
7: return (cˆA, L);
8: else
9: ABSTAIN;
10: end if
11: return ABSTAIN or (cˆA, L)
In our algorithm, the function BPV(ηA, ηA + ηB , p) ≤ α
returns the p-value of two-sided hypothesis test that ηA ∼
Binomial(ηA+ ηB, p). The function RADIUS solves equation
(5) and returns the certified perturbation size L. The function
SAMPLE(f , β, xG , M) randomly generates M samples with
noise control level β, gives prediction for each xG ⊕ ǫ, and
returns the frequency of each class.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our pro-
posed certifiable robustness method. We first describe our
experimental setup. We then demonstrate the effectiveness of
our method and study the performance of our method under
different scenarios.
A. Experimental Setup
We evaluate our method for graph classification on a
synthetic dataset. The synthetic dataset consists of 480
graphs with different topologies, including cycle-type, star-
type, wheel-type, lollipop-type, hypercube-type, grid-type,
complete-type, and cicular ladder-type topology. Our goal is
to classify these graphs into different categories of topology.
We use the well-established GCN algorithm [4] to train the
base graph classifier. Specifically, we establish a two-layer
GCN model and train it beforehand using 320 samples. After
obtaining the trained GCN model, we implement our algorithm
on it and retrain the model, and finally make predictions on
160 test samples. For the m-th testing sample, we can obtain
its prediction result and corresponding certified perturbation
size Lm.
To study the performance of our method, we use the certified
accuracy as the evaluation metric, which is defined as follows.
CA(r) =
∑M
m=1 I(g(xGm ⊕ ǫ) = c)I(Lm > r)
M
,
where r ∈ Z+ represents the certified perturbation size for
our graph classifier and I is an indicator function. The first
indicator is to count the number of testing sample that is
correctly predicted by our algorithm, and the second indicator
is to count the number of testing sample that has its certified
perturbation size Lm larger than r. Therefore, we use r to
represent the certified perturbation size of our graph classifier.
To show the performance of our certification method under
each specific setting, we calculate the certified accuracy for
different r varying from 0 to 16.
B. Experimental Results
We first study the impact of the noise level (1 − β) on
the certified accuracy of our method. Specifically, we show
the certified accuracy with respect to the certified perturbation
size r under different settings of the noise level. We vary
the noise level by changing the value of β from 0.7 to 0.99.
As shown in Figure 1, we can observe that β influences the
trade-off between the certified accuracy and radius. We can
see that as the value of β decreases, the maximum certified
perturbation size increases, which means our method is able
to certificate the robustness for the graph classifier with higher
perturbations, but the certified accuracy decreases. On the
other hand, as the value of β increases, the maximum certified
perturbation size decreases, which means our method is able
to certificate the robustness for the graph classifier with higher
perturbations, but the certified accuracy increases.
Figure 1: Impact of β on our certification method.
Next, we study the impact of confidence level 1−α on the
performance of our certification method. Specifically, we show
the certified accuracy with respect to the certified perturbation
size r when the value of α is 0.01, 0.001, and 0.0001, respec-
tively. As shown in Figure 2, we can see that the confidence
level does not have much impact on the certified accuracy
when r is small. With the increase of the certified perturbation
size r, the certified accuracy tends to be influenced by α.
This is reasonable since smaller α returns a more relaxed
estimation of probability. Hence we have a lower bound of
certified perturbation size.
Figure 2: Impact of α on robustness metric.
Finally, we study the influence of sample time N on the
performance of our method by setting N as 1,000, 5,000,
and 1,0000, respectively. When the certified perturbation size
r is small, the certified accuracy is not influenced by the
sample time, since most testing samples have small certified
perturbation size, a small sample time N is enough to give a
tight estimation of pA. With the increase the sample time, the
maximum certified perturbation size increases, which means
our method tends to certificate the robustness of the graph
classifier with higher perturbations. The reason is that larger
sample time implies a tighter bound of pA, which leads to a
high bound of the certified perturbation size.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have proposed an certification method
to build a smoothed graph classification model with certified
robustness guarantee. We have proven that the resulting graph
classification model would generate the same prediction result
for a graph under bounded adversarial perturbations. Our
approach could be applied for a wide category of graph
classification models. We have conducted extensive experi-
ments on synthetic datasets to demonstrate the effectiveness
of our proposed method on a two-layer graph convolutional
network (GCN) model. In the future, we will study the certified
robustness for other graph-based learning algorithms.
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